In Nabanga, a South Sudanese town bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), fear of the ongoing Bundibugyo Virus disease (BVD) outbreak is already shaping daily life. In September a joint assessment by health authorities and partners identified 3 450 people who had crossed into South Sudan from the DRC amid rumors and growing community concern. Although South Sudan has not reported any confirmed cases of BVD, the continued movement of people has increase anxiety about the possible spread of the disease.
“When I see people crossing from the DRC, I become worried. We hear from relatives in the Congo (DRC) that Ebola is killing people and when we see people arriving from there, we get concerned” said Yoane Fermon, a resident of Nabanga.
Communities share this anxiety and say that fear must be addressed with accurate and accessible information to enable people protect themselves and their families while preventing discrimination against those arriving from DRC. “As one of the community leaders, I understand the concern of our people. At this critical time, they need clear information on Ebola. They need to know how to protect themselves and their loved ones, and to avoid discrimination against people crossing the border,” said Alex Samuel, Nabanga community Chief.
Health authorities are responding through border screening and community engagement. Following the ongoing outbreak of BVD in the DRC, the WHO Regional Office for Africa estimated the risk of importation to South Sudan at 67 percent in June but has since increased the risk to 99% in the latest estimates made in October 2026. This risk of importation is driven by porous borders, cross-border trade, population movement, humanitarian displacement, and major transport corridors, particularly along the western and southern border areas with the DRC.
The recent detection of BVD in Nagero town of Dungu Health Zone in DRC brings the risk closer. Western Equatoria State’s borders are busy with traders, families and travelers, including through informal crossing points. This constant movement means an early warning could come from a border health agent, a community health worker, or a nurse seeing a patient. Each needs a clear pathway to recognize a possible case, raise an alert, safely separate suspected case and connect the person to established Ebola isolation/care facilities.
“When someone arrives with symptoms, we screen them, isolate them in identified holding areas to protect everyone in the facility and arrange their transfer to established Ebola isolation facilities,” Abisia Alfred
With support from WHO, the Ministry of Health continues to intensify preparedness and readiness measures in line with the National Bundibugyo Virus Disease Preparedness and Response Plan and the International Health Regulations (2005) emergency committee temporary recommendations. Working in close collaboration with state/county authorities, communities, and partners. These measures include strengthened surveillance for early detection, enhanced screening at all health care facilities and expansion of the alert management systems, reinforced laboratory preparedness for safe collection, packaging and transportation of suspected BVD specimen, rapid response capacity to investigate all suspected BVD alerts, infection prevention and control measures, risk communication and community engagement, as well as heightened preparedness at priority points of entry and border health services.
As of end of October, South Sudan’s readiness level stands at 72.5 percent with varying levels of readiness in the11 different pillars, alongside strengthened surveillance, screening, isolation and referral capacities and targeted preparedness in 15 high-risk counties. Similarly, sub-national readiness assessments, also using the WHO tool, documented an improvement in mean scores from 41 percent in June 2026 to 56 percent in September 2026.
Due to the investments in surveillance, a cumulative 76 BVD alerts were recorded by 30 October 2026. All the alerts were investigated, and 33 tested negative using rt-PCR at the established molecular centre of the National Public Health Laboratory. The rest were discarded.
Between May and October 2026, a cumulative total of 150 health workers were trained in Ebola case management in the fifteen priority counties. Scenario-based simulation exercises were conducted, temporary infectious diseases units were established in 8 of the 15 counties, and screening, isolation and referral capacities were strengthened at priority points of entry. These measures contributed to the overall improvement in national readiness and helped focus preparedness efforts on areas at highest risk. A full-scale simulation exercise conducted from 19 – 24 October 2026 demonstrated that South Sudan can detect BVD but cannot yet contain it safely.
WHO and its partners reached nearly half a million people in Yambio with key health messages on recognizing symptoms, preventing infection and seeking timely care., chiefs and religious leaders shared information through trusted networks, while local-language materials and radio discussions helped people understand symptoms, prevention and when to seek care.
“The progress in Yambio and Nzara and other high-risk areas shows what coordinated support can achieve”. We now need to close the remaining gaps in hand-offs between pillars, Infection prevention and control supplies and safe referral, so health workers can act quickly if a case is suspected” said Dr Moses Ongom, WHO Representative for South Sudan Officer-in-Charge,
“We thank all the frontline health workers who remain our first line of defense in protecting our communities, playing critical roles in identifying and responding to the several suspected BVD alerts,” said Dr Ader Macar Achiek, Acting Executive Director, National Public Health Institute.”
BVD preparedness in South Sudan has been supported by partners, including ECHO and FCDO, alongside the work of the Ministry of Health (MoH), the National Public Health Institute (NPHI), WHO, other partners, and communities. WHO acknowledges the donors whose support has helped strengthen preparedness in high-risk areas.
Further support is needed to close the gaps identified by the readiness assessments and the full-scale simulation exercise. Investment in sub-national alert management protocols, contact management, proper sample packaging, patient flow and discharge protocols, proper chlorination, laboratory deployment of mobile laboratory, personal protective equipment, safe referral of suspected BVD cases, and sustained screening and community engagement would help counties act quickly if a case is suspected. Readiness has improved, but it must be sustained. Intensifying readiness in the counties bordering DRC makes sense but the risk of BVD importation remains nationwide.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of WHO Regional Office for Africa.
